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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-1790
___________
ELIAS ALFONSO JUAREZ-GONZALEZ,
PETITIONER
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES,
RESPONDENT
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Frederic Leeds 
(Agency No. A075-445-182)
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 7, 2010
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, SMITH and WEIS, Circuit Judges
                                       (Opinion filed: April 9, 2010)  
                          
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
Elias Alfonso Juarez-Gonzalez, a citizen and native of Mexico, became a
lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1997.  On January 3, 2002, the Superior
2Court of New Jersey, Hudson County, convicted Juarez-Gonzalez of criminal restraint in
the third degree in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:13-2.  Juarez-Gonzalez subsequently
departed the United States and, upon his return, the Department of Homeland Security
charged him as removable because he was convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude.  Before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) Juarez-Gonzalez conceded removability
and applied for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  The IJ found that
Juarez-Gonzalez had committed a violent or dangerous crime.  As a result, the IJ
determined that he could not qualify for a waiver of inadmissibility unless he
demonstrated exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1212.7(d). 
Ultimately, the IJ held that Juarez-Gonzalez failed to show the requisite hardship.  On
February 19, 2009, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed and dismissed
Juarez-Gonzalez’s appeal.  Juarez-Gonzalez has filed a petition for review.
The Government has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.  The
Government correctly points out that we do not have jurisdiction to review the Attorney
General’s decision not to grant a waiver of inadmissibility.  See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(I); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h); see also Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627,
634 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[D]espite the changes of the REAL ID Act, factual or discretionary
determinations continue to fall outside the jurisdiction of the court of appeals entertaining
a petition for review.”) We, however, retain the jurisdiction to review constitutional
claims and questions of law.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d
3184, 188 (3d Cir. 2007).  As we explain further below, while Juarez-Gonzalez raises
questions of law, we find that he has not properly exhausted these claims before the IJ
and the BIA.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Hua Wu v. Att’y Gen., 571 F.3d 314, 317 (3d
Cir. 2009) (per curiam).  Therefore, we will grant the Government’s motion to dismiss.   
Juarez-Gonzalez raises two arguments in his petition for review.  First, he
contends that the BIA should have applied a categorical analysis to determine whether his
conviction was a crime of moral turpitude and a “dangerous” crime.  (Petr’s Br. at 16.) 
Juarez-Gonzalez, however, failed to raise this argument before the IJ.  Indeed, as the
Government points out, Juarez-Gonzalez’s counsel admitted that his crime was the type
of crime which triggers the “exception and extremely unusual hardship” standard for
granting a waiver of inadmissability.  (A.R. at 154-55.)  Juarez-Gonzalez also fails to
point to any persuasive authority which required the IJ to apply a categorical analysis to
determine whether his crime qualified as a dangerous crime under 8 C.F.R. § 1212.7. 
Moreover, while we apply the categorical analysis in the crimes against moral turpitude
analysis, Juarez-Gonzalez did not challenge Government’s finding that he was convicted
of a crime of moral turpitude before the IJ, and he may not do so for the first time in this
Court.  Hua Wu 571 F.3d at 317.  Juarez-Gonzalez similarly failed to raise his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim before the IJ or the BIA.  Therefore, we lack jurisdiction over
that claim as well.
4For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the Government’s motion to
dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction and dismiss the petition for review.
